HISTORY
Formation of Airbus
Industrie
Airbus
Industrie was formally established
as a
Groupement d'Interet Économique
(Economic Interest Group or GIE) on
18 December 1970. It had been
formed by a government initiative
between France, Germany and the UK
that originated in 1967. The name
"Airbus" was taken from a
non-proprietary term used by the
airline industry in the 1960s to
refer to a commercial aircraft of a
certain size and range, for this
term was acceptable to the French
linguistically. Aérospatiale and
Deutsche Airbus each took a 36.5%
share of production work, Hawker
Siddeley 20% and Fokker-VFW 7%.
Each company would deliver its
sections as fully equipped,
ready-to-fly items. In October 1971
the Spanish company CASA acquired a
4.2% share of Airbus Industrie, with
Aérospatiale and Deutsche Airbus
reducing their stakes to 47.9%.
In January 1979 British Aerospace,
which had absorbed Hawker Siddeley
in 1977, acquired a 20% share of
Airbus Industrie. The majority
shareholders reduced their shares to
37.9%, while CASA retained its 4.2%.
Transition to Airbus SAS
The
retention of production and
engineering assets by the partner
companies in effect made Airbus
Industrie a sales and marketing
company. This arrangement led
to inefficiencies due to the
inherent conflicts of interest that
the four partner companies faced;
they were both GIE shareholders of,
and subcontractors to, the
consortium. The companies
collaborated on development of the
Airbus range, but guarded the
financial details of their own
production activities and sought to
maximise the transfer prices of
their sub-assemblies. It was
becoming clear that Airbus was no
longer a temporary collaboration to
produce a single plane as per its
original mission statement, it had
become a long term brand for the
development of further aircraft. By
the late 1980s work had begun on a
pair of new medium-sized aircraft,
the biggest to be produced at this
point under the Airbus name, the
Airbus A330 and the Airbus A340.
In the
early 1990s the then Airbus CEO Jean
Pierson argued that the GIE should
be abandoned and Airbus established
as a conventional company.
However, the difficulties of
integrating and valuing the assets
of four companies, as well as legal
issues, delayed the initiative. In
December 1998, when it was reported
that British Aerospace and DASA were
close to merging,
Aérospatiale paralysed negotiations
on the Airbus conversion; the French
company feared the combined
BAe/DASA, which would own 57.9% of
Airbus, would dominate the company
and it insisted on a 50/50 split.
However, the issue was resolved in
January 1999 when BAe abandoned
talks with DASA in favour of merging
with Marconi Electronic Systems to
become BAE Systems.
Then in 2000 three of the four
partner companies (DaimlerChrysler
Aerospace, successor to Deutsche
Airbus; Aérospatiale-Matra,
successor to Sud-Aviation; and CASA)
merged to form EADS, simplifying the
process. EADS now owned Airbus
France, Airbus Deutschland and
Airbus España, and thus 80% of
Airbus Industrie. BAE Systems
and EADS transferred their
production assets to the new
company, Airbus SAS, in return for
shareholdings in that company.
Expansion and sale of BAE
stake
In 2003,
Airbus and the Kaskol Group created
an Airbus Engineering centre in
Russia, which started with 30
engineers and since has emerged as a
model of success for Airbus’
globalisation strategy. It was the
first engineering facility to open
in Europe outside of the company’s
home countries. Equipped with
state-of-the-art communications
equipment and linked with Airbus
engineering sites in France and
Germany, the facility performs
extensive work in disciplines such
as fuselage structure, stress,
system installation and design. In
2011, the centre employs some 200
engineers who have completed over 30
large-scale projects for the A320,
the A330/A340 and the A380 programs.
Russian engineers also performed
more
than half
of all design work on the A330-200F
freighter, with its activity related
to fuselage structure design, floor
grids installation and junctions
design. The centre currently is
involved in the A320neo Sharklets
design development and numerous
design works for the A350 XWB
programme.
On 6 April
2006 plans were announced that BAE
Systems was to sell its 20% share in
Airbus, then "conservatively valued"
at €3.5 billion (US$4.17 billion).
Analysts suggested the move to make
partnerships with U.S. firms more
feasible, in both financial and
political terms. BAE
originally sought to agree on a
price with EADS through an informal
process. Due to lengthy negotiations
and disagreements over price, BAE
exercised its put option which saw
investment bank Rothschild appointed
to give an independent valuation.
In June
2006 Airbus was embroiled
significant international
controversy over its announcement of
further delays in the delivery of
its A380. Following the announcement
the value of associated stock
plunged by up to 25% in a matter of
days, although it soon recovered
afterwards. Allegations of insider
trading on the part of Noël
Forgeard, CEO of EADS, its majority
corporate parent, promptly followed.
The loss of associated value was of
grave concern to BAE, press
described a "furious row" between
BAE and EADS, with BAE believing the
announcement was designed to depress
the value of its share. A
French shareholder group filed a
class action lawsuit against EADS
for failing to inform investors of
the financial implications of the
A380 delays while airlines awaiting
deliveries demanded compensation.
As a result EADS chief Noël Forgeard
and Airbus CEO Gustav Humbert
announced their resignations on 2
July 2006.
On 2 July
2006 Rothschild valued BAE's stake
at £1.9 billion (€2.75 billion),
well below the expectation of BAE,
analysts, and even EADS. On 5
July BAE appointed independent
auditors to investigate how the
value of its share of Airbus had
fallen from the original estimates
to the Rothschild valuation; however
in September 2006 BAE agreed the
sale of its stake in Airbus to EADS
for £1.87 billion (€2.75 billion,
$3.53 billion), pending BAE
shareholder approval. On 4
October shareholders voted in favour
of the sale,
leaving Airbus entirely owned by
EADS.
2007 restructuring
On 9 October
2006 Christian Streiff, Humbert's
successor, resigned due to
differences with parent company EADS
over the amount of independence he
would be granted in implementing his
reorganisation plan for Airbus.
He was succeeded by EADS co-CEO
Louis Gallois, bringing Airbus under
more direct control of its parent
company.
On 28
February 2007, CEO Louis Gallois
announced the company's
restructuring plans. Entitled Power8,
the plan would see 10,000 jobs cut
over four years; 4,300 in France,
3,700 in Germany, 1,600 in the UK
and 400 in Spain. 5,000 of the
10,000 would be at sub contractors.
Plants at Saint Nazaire, Varel and
Laupheim face sell off or closure,
while Meaulte, Nordenham and Filton
are "open to investors". As of
16 September 2008 the Laupheim plant
has been sold to a Thales-Diehl
consortium to form Diehl Aerospace
and while the design activities at
Filton have been retained, the
manufacturing operations have been
sold to GKN of the United Kingdom.
The announcements resulted in Airbus
unions in France and Germany
threatening strike action.
Competition with Boeing
Airbus is in
tight competition with Boeing every
year for aircraft orders. Though
both manufacturers have a broad
product range in various segments
from single-aisle to wide-body,
their aircraft do not always compete
head-to-head. Instead they respond
with models slightly smaller or
bigger than the other in order to
plug any holes in demand and achieve
a better edge. The A380, for
example, is designed to be larger
than the 747. The A350XWB competes
with the high end of the 787 and the
low end of the 777. The A320 is
bigger than the 737-700 but smaller
than the 737–800. The A321 is bigger
than the 737–900 but smaller than
the previous 757-200. Airlines see
this as a benefit since they get a
more complete product range from 100
seats to 500 seats than if both
companies offered identical
aircraft.
In recent
years the Boeing 777 has outsold its
Airbus counterparts, which include
the A340 family as well as the
A330-300. The smaller A330-200
competes with the 767, outselling
its Boeing counterpart in recent
years. The A380 is anticipated to
further reduce sales of the Boeing
747, gaining Airbus a share of the
market in very large aircraft,
though frequent delays in the A380
programme have caused several
customers to consider the refreshed
747–8.
Airbus has also proposed the A350
XWB to compete with the fast-selling
Boeing 787 Dreamliner, after being
under great pressure from airlines
to produce a competing model.
There are
around 5,102 Airbus aircraft in
service, with Airbus managing to win
over 50 per cent of aircraft orders
in recent years. Airbus products are
still outnumbered 3 to 1 by
in-service Boeings (there are over
4,500 Boeing 737s alone in service).
This however is indicative of
historical success – Airbus made a
late entry into the modern jet
airliner market (1972 vs. 1958 for
Boeing).
Airbus
won a greater share of orders in
2003 and 2004. In 2005, Airbus
achieved 1111 (1055 net) orders,
compared to 1029 (net of 1002) for
the same year at rival Boeing.
However, Boeing won 55% of 2005
orders proportioned by value; and in
the following year Boeing won more
orders by both measures. Airbus in
2006 achieved its second best year
ever in its entire 35 year history
in terms of the number of orders it
received, 824, second only to the
previous year.
In August 2010, Airbus announced
that it was increasing production of
A320 airliners, to reach 40 per
month by 2012, at a time when Boeing
is increasing monthly 737 production
from 31.5 to 35 per month.
Boeing
has continually protested over
"launch aid" and other forms of
government aid to Airbus, while
Airbus has argued that Boeing
receives illegal subsidies through
military and research contracts and
tax breaks.
In July 2004
former Boeing CEO Harry Stonecipher
accused Airbus of abusing a 1992
bilateral EU-US agreement providing
for disciplines for large civil
aircraft support from governments.
Airbus is given reimbursable launch
investment (RLI), called "launch
aid" by the US, from European
governments with the money being
paid back with interest plus
indefinite royalties, but only if
the aircraft is a commercial
success. Airbus contends that
this system is fully compliant with
the 1992 agreement and WTO rules.
The agreement allows up to 33 per
cent of the programme cost to be met
through government loans which are
to be fully repaid within 17 years
with interest and royalties. These
loans are held at a minimum interest
rate equal to the cost of government
borrowing plus 0.25%, which would be
below market rates available to
Airbus without government support.
Airbus claims that since the
signature of the EU-US agreement in
1992, it has repaid European
governments more than U.S.$6.7
billion and that this is 40% more
than it has received.
Airbus
argues that the military contracts
awarded to Boeing, the second
largest U.S. defence contractor, are
in effect a form of subsidy, such as
the controversy surrounding the
Boeing KC-767 military contracting
arrangements. The significant U.S.
government support of technology
development via NASA also provides
significant support to Boeing, as do
the large tax breaks offered to
Boeing, which some people claim are
in violation of the 1992 agreement
and WTO rules. In its recent
products such as the 787, Boeing has
also been offered direct financial
support from local and state
governments.
In January
2005 the European Union and United
States trade representatives, Peter
Mandelson and Robert Zoellick
respectively, agreed to talks aimed
at resolving the increasing
tensions. These talks were not
successful with the dispute becoming
more acrimonious rather than
approaching a settlement.
WTO ruled
in August 2010 and in May 2011 that
Airbus had received improper
government subsidies through loans
with below market rates from several
European countries. In a
separate ruling in February 2011,
WTO found that Boeing had received
local and federal aid in violation
of WTO rules.
Source: Wikipedia
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